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DOES AN INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN OFFICIAL
QUALIFY AS A FOREIGN STATE FOR PURPOSES
OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT?
Erin Nelson'
In 2005, Hafsat Abiola, Anthony Enahoro, and Arthur Nwankwo'
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois under the Alien Tort Claims Act,2 alleging violations of
international and Nigerian law, assault and battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and wrongful death, among other claims.' Abiola
brought suit to vindicate wrongs committed against her parents, who had
been pro-democracy activists in Nigeria. In her complaint, Abiola
alleged that her father was imprisoned, beaten, and denied medical care,
and that he died after drinking tea prepared for him in the office of
General Abdusalami Abubakar, a ranking member of the Provisional
' J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A., 2006 Boston College. The author would like to thank Professor Peter B.
Rutledge for his invaluable guidance and expertise and Corey Ames for her editing advice
and support throughout the writing process. The author also wishes to thank the staff of
the Catholic University Law Review for all of their hard work and dedication.
1. Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 908-09 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd sub nom.
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 910. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Alien Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). An expansive reading of the ATCA has been criticized. Adam
Liptak, Class-Action Firms Extend Reach to Global Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2007, at A33 ("Business groups and the State Department have urged the courts to
interpret the law narrowly, saying that allowing such suits is a form of judicial imperialism
that can interfere with American foreign policy."); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the ATCA should be read broadly
because it "was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the
creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law"). But see
Andrew B. Mohraz, Note, The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain (2004) on the Alien Tort Statute, 12 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 363, 363
(2006) (noting that the Court affirmed the validity of the ATCA in Sosa, despite the
Court's holding that the statute did not permit the plaintiff to recover under the
circumstances).
3. Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 908. The complaint included seven claims: "torture;
arbitrary detention; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault
and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful death." Enaharo,
408 F.3d at 880.
4. Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 908-09.
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Ruling Council (PRC).5 She also claimed that her mother had been
"gunned down in her car" by the PRC.6 Enahoro and Nwankwo brought
claims for imprisonment and violence committed against them as a result
of their status as pro-democracy activists in Nigeria.7 Each plaintiff's
claim was directed against Abubakar, who had assumed the position of
the head of state of Nigeria in 1998.8 Abubakar claimed immunity from
suit and argued that each plaintiff's causes of action must be dismissed
pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).9 Abubakar
asserted the FSIA immunity defense on behalf of himself, acting as an
individual foreign official and head of state during the time in question? °
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit shattered prior
precedent when it held that the FSIA was not the source of immunity for
individual foreign officials such as General Abubakar." Prior to the
Seventh Circuit's decision, the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuit's each had held that the FSIA governed individual
5. Id. at 909. Abiola's father ran for election in Nigeria; she alleged that he won the
election prior to the military regime's invalidation of the results. Id. After he declared
himself President of Nigeria, Abiola's father was accused of committing treason, arrested,
and imprisoned until his death on July 9, 1998. Id.
6. Id. Several members of the PRC and others were being tried for Abiola's
mother's death at the time the complaint was filed. Id.
7. Id. Anthony Enahoro, the second plaintiff, was a political activist imprisoned for
his criticisms of the military regime in Nigeria. Id. During his imprisonment, Enahoro, a
diabetic, was denied access to medical care. Id. As an internationally recognized pro-
democracy activist, he was ultimately granted asylum in the United States. Id. The third
plaintiff was political activist Arthur Nwankwo. Id. He was arrested, "stripped naked,
flogged with a cane, and carried away in a car trunk." Id. Nwankwo was freed from
prison on August 24, 1998. Id.
8. Id. at 908. The complaint accused Abubakar of committing the alleged acts
during a politically unstable era in Nigeria that spanned from 1983 to 1999. Id.
9. Id. at 910; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604
(2000) ("[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter."). Abubakar also argued that the court did not have proper jurisdiction over the
matter because an "exhaustion-of-remedies requirement" must be met before bringing a
cause of action under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d
at 910; see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). The
court dismissed this argument because the plaintiffs had not asserted a TVPA claim.
Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
10. Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10 ("[T]he Act makes no mention of any immunity
afforded to individuals. Abubakar maintains that it is well established that the FSIA
applies to foreign officials and thus to heads of state .... ").
11. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005). Abubakar filed an
interlocutory appeal of the district court's immunity determination with the Seventh
Circuit. Id. at 880. The district court had limited Abubakar's immunity claim to only
those actions he took while head of state of Nigeria. Abiola, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 916-17.
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foreign official immunity.1 2  The Seventh Circuit ultimately granted
Abubakar immunity as to acts he committed while he was acting as the
head of state of Nigeria, but denied immunity as to those acts committed
while Abubakar was acting as an individual foreign official in the
capacity of a general and member of the PRC."3
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted by Congress in
1976 14 to codify the body of common law which had governed foreign
sovereign immunity.5 The FSIA is the exclusive means by which a
16federal court can obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state. The FSIA
provides that a foreign state will be immune from suit in both federal and
state courts unless the conduct of the foreign state at issue is covered by
one of the exceptions provided for in the statute. 7 Therefore, a finding
that the FSIA applies and the alleged conduct falls into one of the stated
exceptions is critical. Without such a finding, the court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case, resulting in its immediate dismissal.'
As a preliminary matter, a court considering the applicability of the
FSIA must assess whether the party claiming immunity is a "foreign
state" as defined in § 1603 of the statute. 9 Only foreign states can claim
20immunity from suit under the statute. Prior to 2005, the Fourth, Sixth,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits agreed that individual foreign
12. Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent.
Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75
F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th
Cir. 1990).
13. See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. The Seventh Circuit failed to suggest any
alternative method for analyzing individual foreign official immunity. See id. Instead, the
court noted the Supreme Court's finding of congressional intent "'that the FSIA be the
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts."' Id. at 882-83
(quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)).
14. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891,
2892-98 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007)).
15. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605;
see also Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2357 (2007) ("In
enacting the FSIA, Congress intended to codify the restrictive theory's limitation of
immunity to sovereign acts." (citations omitted)).
16. Permanent Mission of India, 127 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. at 439); see also 48 C.J.S. International Law § 40 (2004) ("The Act gives
the United States District Courts original jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy, of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as to any claim for relief in
personam .... Personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign also exists only when one of
the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applies." (footnotes omitted)).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605-07 (West 2006 & Supp.
2007).
18. See Permanent Mission of India, 127 S. Ct. at 2355.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2000) ("A 'foreign state' ... includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state ... .
20. Id. § 1604.
Catholic University Law Review
officials were included in the definition of a foreign state under the
FSIA.21 The Seventh Circuit created a circuit split when it held that an
individual foreign official is not permitted to claim immunity under the
FSIA because such an official does not fall within the statute's definition
of a foreign state.22  Congress sought to create uniformity and
predictability in foreign sovereign immunity when it enacted the FSIA. 
3
With respect to individual foreign officials, however, the FSIA's silence
has only complicated the legal standard.24  Another motivation for the
enactment of the FSIA was to "transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby
reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations.,
21
The ability of plaintiffs to forum shop and circumvent the FSIA due to its
varying interpretations may lead to similar negative consequences for
United States officials who are subject to suit abroad.26
The Seventh Circuit's holding that the FSIA does not govern the
immunity of individual foreign officials has been cited favorably by the
Department of Justice.27 The language of the FSIA does not textually
21. Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller
v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002); EI-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990).
22. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005).
23. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6604
(stating that the purpose of the FSIA is "to provide when and how parties can maintain a
lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States and to
provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity").
24. See, e.g., Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 160 (2nd Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is
an open question in this circuit whether individual officials enjoy sovereign immunity
under the FSIA."); Bolkiah v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 547 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (noting that "[t]here was some initial disagreement whether a natural person could
ever be considered an 'agent or instrumentality of a foreign state' within the meaning of
the FSIA given its statutory definition and legislative history," but citing to Chuidian for
the proposition that the FSIA may apply to an individual foreign official acting in his
official capacity). See generally Working Group of the American Bar Association,
Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 493
(2002) (providing analysis on the current state of the FSIA and provisions of the statute
that have been clarified, or further complicated, by judicial interpretation).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
26. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24 (1988) (emphasizing the importance
of protecting American diplomats abroad); Statement of Interest of the United States of
America at 22, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270)
[hereinafter Matar Statement of Interest] ("It is ... of critical importance that American
courts recognize the same immunity defense for foreign officials, as any refusal to do so
could easily lead foreign jurisdictions to refuse such protection for American officials in
turn.").
27. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-1763, -2216)
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commit the immunity of individual foreign officials to the FSIA, and
Congress did not intend for the statute to apply in these circumstances.2
Further, international opinion also indicates that determinations of
individual foreign official immunity may be considered a separate inquiry
from the immunity of a foreign state.29 When the court is presented with
the issue of whether an "individual foreign official" should be granted
foreign sovereign immunity, the court should analyze the issue using
common law that was developed prior to the enactment of the FSIA.)°
This Comment argues that the split in authority among the federal
circuit courts as to whether the FSIA should apply to individual foreign
officials must be resolved in favor of the Seventh Circuit approach. In
Part I, this Comment first explores the well-established precedent of
granting individual foreign officials immunity from suit in the United
States. It examines an early form of sovereign immunity, "absolute
immunity," as well as the shift to the "restrictive" theory of sovereign
immunity in 1952. This Comment then explores the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act itself, with particular attention to the statutory language
that created the circuit split on the issue of individual immunity. This
Comment also considers the post-FSIA case law and the differing
approaches to individual foreign official immunity, specifically focusing
on the approaches taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Part II of
this Comment addresses why the FSIA was not intended to apply to the
sovereign immunity of individual foreign officials and why the Ninth
Circuit, as well as the Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits,
incorrectly applied the FSIA in this manner. The Comment considers
the statutory language and legislative history of the FSIA, international
approaches to individual foreign official immunity, and the possible
negative repercussions of granting individual foreign officials immunity
under the statute. This Comment ultimately suggests in Part III that the
Seventh Circuit's approach to the FSIA is correct. The FSIA, as enacted,
should not be applied to determine the immunity of individual foreign
officials. Instead, courts must look to the federal common law developed
prior to the enactment of the FSIA to determine whether an individual
foreign official should be granted immunity. Finally, this Comment
recommends that Congress amend the FSIA to clarify the source of
individual foreign official immunity.
[hereinafter Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest] ("[T]he immunity of individual foreign
officials is not governed by the FSIA.").
28. Id. at 3, 6-7.
29. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 20-21.
30. See Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 3. A common-law
determination of immunity may involve the court looking to the executive branch for a
"suggestion of immunity." See id. at 3-4.
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I. ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURTS
AND APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN OFFICIALS
A. Early Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was not the first articulation of
sovereign immunity in American legal thought.31 In 1812, Chief Justice
Marshall articulated an early form of sovereign immunity in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.32 The Chief Justice began by noting
that while "[tlhe jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute," jurisdiction is not without some
qualification. Common interests fostered interaction amongst sovereign
31. See Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955) ("The
freedom of a foreign sovereign from being haled into court as a defendant has impressive
title-deeds."). The birthplace of the theory of sovereign immunity is found in the
historical assumption that the king "could do no wrong." Manuel R. Garcfa-Mora, The
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and its Recent Modifications, 42 VA. L.
REV. 335, 336 (1956). The immunity a king would be granted in his own kingdom was
thereafter recognized when the king happened to be in the country of another:
"If... [the] prince be come to negotiate, or to treat about some public affair, he
is doubtless entitled in a more eminent degree to enjoy all the rightp of
ambassadors. If he be come as a traveller [sic], his dignity alone, and the regard
due to the nation which he represents and governs, shelters him from all insult,
gives him a claim to respect and attention of every kind, and exempts him from
all jurisdiction."
Id. at 337 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATEL, LES DROIT DES GENS BK. IV.C.VII § 108
(Joseph Chitty trans., 1867) (1758)). In effect, a "mutually protective arrangement" of
foreign sovereign immunity was established. Id. at 336-37.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606. The case involved a dispute over the
ownership of a vessel. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117. The plaintiff filed
suit alleging that he owned the vessel and it was taken from him by parties in the service of
Napoleon, the Emperor of France. Id. Plaintiff argued that because the ship was at port
in Philadelphia, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the court and should be returned to its
lawful owner. Id. Chief Justice Marshall ultimately concluded that the ship was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court because it had been
in the service of a foreign sovereign, with whom the government of the United
States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her reception,
on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a
friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory,
under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, . . . she should be
exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.
Id. at 147. There was no body of common law on which Chief Justice Marshall could draw
to provide legal support for his opinion. ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY
CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005). His articulation of sovereign
immunity was the first in United States courts. As a result, Chief Justice Marshall looked
to the philosophical writings of Vattel, Hobbes, and Rousseau, among others. Id.
33. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136 (reasoning that this
qualification derived from the consent of the nation for the benefit of interchange with
other sovereigns).
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states and required the waiver of a state's right to absolute jurisdiction
when dealing with another sovereign state in certain circumstances.-
The Chief Justice reasoned that this was because
[o]ne sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and
being bound by obligations of the highest character not to
degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its
sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to
his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to
him.35
Thus, a state would impliedly consent to a foreign state's immunity from
suit in that state's jurisdiction in exchange for the benefits the state
would gain from continuing to interact with the foreign state, particularly
36in the realm of commerce.
Even in Chief Justice Marshall's early articulation of foreign sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court acknowledged that sovereign immunity
extended beyond the foreign state itself to the individual head of state
and his foreign ministers.37 There was a general consensus, in the United
States as well as in the international community, that the head of state
and his foreign ministers are essentially the personal representation of
the sovereign state itself and thus should be granted the same immunity.38
In 1897, the Supreme Court was directly presented with the question of
whether to apply foreign sovereign immunity to an individual foreign
official in the case of Underhill v. Hernandez.39 The plaintiff, an
American citizen, brought suit against General Hernandez for wrongs
committed against him while working for the government of Venezuela
in the midst of a civil war.40 The issue the Court addressed was whether a
34. Id. The immunity granted to foreign states is unlike the immunity granted to the
states through the Eleventh Amendment. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 348 U.S. at 358-59.
Foreign sovereign immunity is not a principle of constitutional law but a consideration of
international foreign policy. Id. at 359.
35. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 137-38. Regarding foreign ministers, the Court was concerned that if a
minister was subject to the jurisdiction of another country the minister would sacrifice the
loyalty due his sovereign because he "would owe temporary and local allegiance to a
foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects of his mission." Id. at 139.
38. Id. at 138.
39. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
40. Id. at 251. George F. Underhill had contracted with the government of
Venezuela to build a waterworks system. He also owned a machinery repair business in
Venezuela. Id. Underhill alleged that Hernandez refused him his right to a passport to
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country's military general should be immune from suit in American
courts, similar to the immunity he would be granted if he had been the
head of state of Venezuela.'I The Court ultimately held that
Hernandez's acts were the acts of the government of Venezuela and
therefore he was immune from suit.42 Hernandez acted on behalf of the
government when he forced Underhill to stay in Venezuela against his
will, and so Hernandez was "representing the authority of the
revolutionary party as a government. 4 3  Thus Hernandez, as an
individual foreign official of Venezuela, was eligible for the same
immunity from suit that would be granted to Venezuela's head of state."
1. The Executive Branch Controlled Sovereign Immunity by Issuing
Suggestions of Immunity
The procedural mechanism for granting immunity from suit to a
foreign state, prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, was the
executive branch's suggestion of immunity. 5  These suggestions of
immunity were traditionally issued by the Department of State. The
Department of State submitted the suggestions of immunity to the court
where the litigation was pending. 6  Beginning with Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange47 and continuing "[f]or the
return to the United States, which caused him delay, and that Hernandez's soldiers also
committed "certain alleged assaults and affronts." Id.
41. Id. at 253-54.
42. Id. at 254. Before the Court could determine whether General Hernandez should
be immune from suit, it had to resolve whether he was an individual foreign official of the
government of Venezuela. Id. at 252-53. At the time, Venezuela was in the midst of a
civil war. Two parties in opposition to one another claimed control of the government.
Id. The Court set forth the conditions under which the acts of a revolutionary government
would be recognized as the acts of the independent state and liability could be imposed.
Id. at 253. Were the revolutionary party to succeed in its revolt and the independence of
the government to be recognized, liability could be imposed for "the acts of such
government from the commencement of its existence." Id. However, in the event a
revolutionary party fails, "acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of individual
liability." Id. The Court found that in this case, "[t]he acts complained of were the acts of
a military commander representing the authority of the revolutionary party as a
government, which afterwards succeeded and was recognized by the United States." Id. at
254. Thus, individual liability would be permitted. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court's decision that "'the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of
Venezuela."' Id. (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1895)).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606.
46. See id. at 8, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606-07.
47. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135. In The Schooner Exchange, the Attorney General
for the District of Pennsylvania filed a suggestion at the request of the executive branch
that the suit be dismissed with costs. Id. at 116, 118-19.
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next 165 years," courts looked to suggestions of immunity made by the
Department of State to guide them in their decision for grants of
immunity from suit.8 When a foreign state requested a suggestion of
immunity from the executive branch, the Department of State generally
complied with the request as long as the foreign state was considered a
"friendly foreign sovereign[].15
49
When the executive branch failed to make a suggestion of immunity
the court would purport to read into the executive branch's silence on
the matter)0 The Supreme Court case of Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman
illustrates this procedure. 1 In Hoffman, the Department of State did not
make a suggestion of immunity on behalf of the Republic of Mexico.
Nonetheless, the Court looked to the executive branch for guidance on
the immunity determination, stating that it would "inquire whether the
ground of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the
department to recognize."53 Thus, even in silence, the executive branch
influenced the Court's decisions on grants of immunity to foreign states. 4
In Hoffman, the rationale underpinning the policy of adhering to
executive branch suggestions of immunity was the need to avoid
48. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the that the usual
procedure for sovereign immunity determinations involved dismissal of suits after the
executive branch, through the Department of State, suggested immunity).
49. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). But see H.R. REP.
No. 94-1487, at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06 (criticizing the
Department of State policy of granting immunity to friendly foreign sovereigns because of
the impact that outside diplomatic influence may have on a decision to grant immunity
when that decision is not determined by looking to established guidelines and standards).
50. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 31-32, 36.
53. Id. at 36. In Hoffman, the Court did not accept the claim of sovereign immunity
Mexico made on behalf of the steamship Baja California. Id. at 31, 38. The steamship was
owned by Mexico but operated under a lease by a private party for commercial purposes.
Id. at 32-33. The Department of State did not present an opinion to the Court as to
whether immunity should be granted under these circumstances. Id. at 31-32. Instead, the
Department simply provided citations to a case where a ship was not found to be in the
"possession and public service of [a] foreign government" and to another case where the
contrary was found. Id.
54. See id. at 34-35. The Court held that the Department's silence on a matter to
which it had the opportunity to present an opinion would be considered controlling. Id. at
38. The Court reasoned that "recognition by the courts of an immunity upon principles
which the political department of government has not sanctioned may be equally
embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national interests and their recognition
by other nations." Id. at 36. The Court further relied upon the fact that the Department
had refrained from granting immunity on the grounds of state ownership of a vessel,
without actual possession of the vessel by the State in the past. See id. at 36-37.
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interference with the executive in conducting foreign affairs." Foreign
affairs are within the province of the Executive Branch and therefore it
was appropriate for the Court to look to the Executive Branch's opinion
on the matter.5 6 The Court did not abdicate its role as the interpreter of
the law by cooperating with the Executive Branch because, unlike the
immunity of the states,7 foreign sovereign immunity is not found in the
18text of the Constitution. Thus, as the Court reaffirmed in a case in 1983,
granting immunity to foreign states is not a constitutional requirement
that must be interpreted by the judicial branch, but the subject of
international policy on which the court defers to the executive branch's
suggestions of immunity. 9
These early articulations of foreign sovereign immunity served as a
precursor to the development of sovereign immunity in the twentieth
century. Chief Justice Marshall's articulation of immunity in The
Schooner Exchange would become known as absolute immunity,60 as
compared to restrictive immunity, which began with the Department of
State's issuance of the Tate Letter in 1952.61
55. Id. at 35 ("It is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise
or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass
the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. 'In such cases the judicial department of
this government follows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter
by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."' (quoting United States v Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209
(1882))).
56. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (setting out provisions of executive
power, including the power to make treaties, appoint ambassadors and consuls, and
receive foreign ambassadors and consuls).
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
58. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
59. Id. ("As The Schooner Exchange made clear,.., foreign sovereign immunity is a
matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed
by the Constitution. Accordingly, this Court consistently has deferred to the decisions of
the political branches-in particular, those of the Executive Branch-on whether to take
jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.").
60. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)
("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute.... All exceptions, therefore .... must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself."). The theory of absolute immunity extended immunity from suit to foreign
sovereigns in all instances where they were haled into a U.S. court. Robert B. von
Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33,
34 (1978).
61. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
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2. The Tate Letter and the Adoption of the Restrictive Theory of
Sovereign Immunity
In 1952, the Department of State issued the Tate Letter and articulated
a shift in the policy of sovereign immunity. 2  Prior to 1952, the
Department would make a suggestion of immunity whenever the party
involved was found to be a friendly sovereign." The Tate Letter
modified the policy of granting absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns
and embraced a policy of restrictive immunity.64 Under the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, a court would not grant immunity to a
foreign sovereign if the dispute arose from the commercial activities of
65the sovereign. Immunity was limited to situations where the case arose
out of a sovereign's public acts.66
The Department issued the Tate Letter in response to the growth of
international commerce and the consequent need to distinguish between
a foreign state's traditional public activities and its actions as a
participant in commerce.6' The House of Representatives Report on the
62. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689-90 (2004) ("Until 1952 the
Executive Branch followed a policy of requesting immunity in all actions against friendly
sovereigns. In that year, however, the State Department concluded that 'immunity should
no longer be granted in certain types of cases.' In a letter to the Acting Attorney General,
the Acting Legal Adviser for the Secretary of State, Jack B. Tate, explained that the
Department would thereafter apply the 'restrictive theory' of sovereign immunity .
(footnote and citations omitted)).
63. Id. at 689; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486-87.
64. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL.
984, 984-85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter] ("A study of the law of sovereign immunity
reveals the existence of two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity .... According to
the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with
respect to private acts (jure gestionis) .... [I]t will hereafter be the Department's policy to
follow the restrictive theory ... in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for
a grant of sovereign immunity."); see also Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690 (quoting passages);
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. 682 app. 2 at 711, 714.
65. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Solicitor General,
Dep't of Justice (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. 682
app. 1 at 707 [hereinafter Leigh Letter] ("Moreover, since 1952, the Department of State
has adhered to the position that the commercial and private activities of foreign states do
not give rise to sovereign immunity. Implicit in this position is a determination that
adjudications of commercial liability against foreign states do not impede the conduct of
foreign relations, and that such adjudications are consistent with international law on
sovereign immunity.").
66. Tate Letter, supra note 64, at 984; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
67. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 699 (asserting that the policy behind
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was to "assure those engaging in commercial
transactions with foreign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in the courts
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FSIA explained that "American citizens are increasingly coming into
contact with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states. These
interactions arise in a variety of circumstances, and they call into
question whether our citizens will have access to the courts to resolve
ordinary legal disputes."
The Tate Letter did not significantly affect the procedure courts
employed when granting immunity, despite its effect on the substantive
law of foreign sovereign immunity.69 The Department of State continued
to issue statements of interest in sovereign immunity cases and courts
continued to recognize their significance. In addition to having a
whenever possible"); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606-07 (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex
Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)) (stating that the Tate Letter was issued in
response to international law and two Supreme Court cases decided within the previous
ten years).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605; see
also Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., (1977) 1 Q.B. 529, 576 (U.K.) (Shaw,
L.J.) (expanding on the changing circumstances that made the adoption of restrictive
immunity inevitable), cited in von Mehren, supra note 59, at 37 n.19. In describing the
changing circumstances in international relations, Lord Justice Shaw wrote that
The radical changes in political and economic and sociological concepts since the
first world war have falsified the very foundations of the old doctrine of
sovereign immunity .... To apply a universal doctrine of sovereign immunity to
such activities is more likely to disserve than to conserve the comity of nations on
the preservation of which the doctrine is founded. It is no longer necessary or
desirable that what are truly matters of trading rather than of sovereignty should
be hedged about with special exonerations and fenced off from the processes of
the law by the attribution of a perverse and inappropriate notion of sovereign
dignity.
Id.
69. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690 ("[T]he change in State Department policy wrought by
the 'Tate Letter' had little, if any, impact on federal courts' approach to immunity
analyses: 'As in the past, initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity
fell primarily upon the Executive acting through the State Department,' and courts
continued to 'abid[e] by' that Department's suggestions of immunity." (quoting Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted)).
While the Supreme Court stated in Altmann that the procedural mechanisms for
determining immunity did not change after the Tate Letter, "[t]he change did, however,
throw immunity determinations into some disarray, as 'foreign nations often placed
diplomatic pressure on the State Department,' and political considerations sometimes led
the Department to file 'suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have
been available under the restrictive theory."' Id. (quoting Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at
487).
70. Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff'd sub nom.
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005). While the Department of State
continued to issue suggestions of immunity, it adopted a new policy of allowing the parties
to a foreign sovereign immunity dispute to appear before an informal hearing to present
oral argument and petition the Department of State with written briefs. Von Mehren,
supra note 59, at 41.
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minimal effect on the procedural aspects of sovereign immunity
determinations, the Tate Letter and the adoption of the restrictive
immunity doctrine did not have significant repercussions for individual
foreign official immunity.]
3. The Tate Letter and Subsequent Case Law Elucidate the Immunity of
Individual Foreign Officials
The Tate Letter and the subsequent case of Greenspan v. Crosbie
further clarified the scope of individual foreign official immunity. 7 After
the Department of State implemented the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity through the Tate Letter, a separate methodology of legal
analysis was required in determining the immunity of individual foreign
officials. 73 Although Greenspan was a federal district court case and does
not have the same precedential weight of a higher court decision, it
nonetheless illustrates how a court applied individual foreign official
immunity at the time Congress enacted the FSIA.74  Notably in
Greenspan, the district court held that the immunity of an individual
foreign official was greater than the immunity granted to a foreign state
under the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity.75 The case involved a
suit against Canada's Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as
individual officials of the Province, for violating U.S. securities laws.76
The Department of State did not suggest immunity for the Province
because the Province had acted in its "commercial capacity" when it
publicly sold the stock it owned in Canadian Javelin, a Canadian
corporation.77 However, the Department suggested immunity for the
71. See Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 8 ("As before the Tate Letter,
the State Department continued to recognize the immunity of foreign officials for their
official acts in suggestions of immunity made to the federal courts. Likewise, the federal
courts continued to defer to such suggestions when they were presented." (citations
omitted)).
72. See Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91 95, 780, at 90,826, 90,827 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976), available at 1976 WL 841; Tate
Letter, supra note 64, at 984-85.
73. See Greenspan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,827;
cf Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 7-8.
74. See Greenspan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,827.
As written in the statement of interest filed by the United States in Matar v. Dichter,
"[d]ecided in late 1976, Greenspan reflects the scope of common-law immunity for
individual foreign officials as it existed when the FSIA was enacted that same year."
Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 10.
75. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 9.
76. Greenspan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,826.
77. Id. at 90,826-27 ("With respect to the Province of Newfoundland, the Department
recognizes and allows the immunity of the Province from suit, except insofar as plaintiffs'
claims may be based upon direct injuries to purchasers of securities in the United States
arising from (a) any immediate steps taken by the Province to affect the sale of securities
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individual foreign official of the Province and the court held these
individuals immune from suit.
78
Greenspan illustrates two features of individual foreign official
immunity at the time the FSIA was enacted. First, the Department of
State separated the analysis of the immunity of the individual foreign
officials from the immunity of the foreign state. 9 Second, while the
foreign state was subject to the principles of restrictive immunity, the
individual foreign officials were not.80 Referring to Greenspan, the
Department of Justice, in a letter addressing the Second Circuit, stated
that "the immunity then recognized for foreign officials acting in their
official capacity did not merely match, but rather exceeded, that of the
state: even if the state could be sued for an official's acts under the
restrictive theory, the official himself could not be."81 Therefore, at the
time the FSIA was enacted, individual foreign official immunity required
a separate legal analysis and as a result, was not subject to the restrictive
immunity applied to foreign states by the Department of State and the
courts8 2
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Codified the Restrictive Theory
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted by Congress in
1976 to codify the "'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity" and
ensure that the determination of whether to grant immunity to a foreign
state was a judicial determination rather than a question for
consideration by the executive branch. 3 Congress was motivated by the
in the United States, (b) any alleged misrepresentation in violation of United States
securities laws, made by the Province in effecting the sale of securities in the United
States, (c) any alleged failure to disclose material information which the Province, in
effecting the sale of securities in the United States, was required to disclose under U.S.
securities laws."). Though the court held that the Province of Newfoundland was not
immune from suit, the complaint was ultimately dismissed because section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 applied only to "'persons,"' the statutory definition
of which did not include governments. Id. at 90,827 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 90,826-27.
79. See id. (quoting the suggestion of immunity the Department of State issued at the
request of the Canadian Embassy); see also Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at
9.
80. See Greenspan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,826-
27; see also Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 9-10.
81. Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 8.
82. See Greenspan, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,827;
see also Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 3-4; Matar Statement of
Interest, supra note 26, at 9.
83. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-
06; see also id., as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 ("At present, there are no
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increasing interaction between the United States and foreign parties, and
the lack of any clear guidance should litigation arise.' Codification of
sovereign immunity was also necessary to bring the United States in line
with international thought on the subject. Most countries had previously
established that sovereign immunity would be decided by their judicial
81branch counterparts.
The FSIA, at 28 U.S.C. § 1604, provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States and of the States except as provided in
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.86
The statute defines a "'foreign state"' in § 1603(a) as a "political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state.' 87 An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is defined in §
1603(b) to mean
any entity ... (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and... (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or a
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and ... (3) which is neither a citizen of a
State of the United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (e)
of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
The FSIA definition of what constitutes a foreign state is essential
because the exceptions to immunity found in the Act are the only means
by which a state or federal court can have subject matter jurisdiction over
the foreign state.89
comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties when they can have
recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign state.").
84. See id. at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
85. Id. See also von Mehren, supra note 60, at 33, 38-39 ("Prior to the passage of the
Immunities Act in October 1976, all of the important trading and industrial countries with
the sole exception of the United Kingdom, had adopted some form of the other of the
restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.").
86. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
87. Id. § 1603(a).
88. Id. § 1603(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
89. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)
("We think that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.");
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983) ("If one of the specified
exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal district court may exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1330(a); but if the claim does not fall within one of
the exceptions, federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction."). The burden of proving
that the FSIA applies shifts between the litigants. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882
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1. The Impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on Individual
Foreign Official Immunity Has Not Been Resolved
The effect of the FSIA on the sovereign immunity of individual foreign
officials has not yet been satisfactorily resolved.9 The Fourth, Sixth,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the FSIA grants
immunity to individual foreign officials. 91  Despite their apparent
agreement on this conclusion, the Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits have further held that immunity is granted to individuals
through the "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" language in
§ 1603(b), 2 while the Fourth Circuit has not done so explicitly.93 Instead,
the Fourth Circuit has held that although the FSIA is silent with respect
to individual foreign official immunity, immunity is extended to such
individuals through a judicially constructed extension. In sharp contrast
to the conclusion of the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has held that the FSIA does not apply to
individual foreign officials, and therefore immunity must be granted by
other means.9
2. Individual Foreign Officials Qualify as an "Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State" Under the FSIA
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the FSIA to provide sovereign
immunity to individual foreign officials acting in their official capacity.96
In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, the court considered whether a
member of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, an
executive agency of the Philippine government, could be granted
immunity from suit under the FSIA.97 The court ultimately resolved the
(2005). First, the party seeking immunity from suit must make a prima facie showing that
it qualifies as a foreign state under § 1603 of the statute. Id. Then the opposing party
must "produce evidence that the entity is not entitled to immunity." Id. Finally, the
burden shifts back to the party claiming immunity, as that party bears the "ultimate
burden of proving immunity." Id.
90. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881-82.
91. See cases cited supra note 12.
92. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); EI-Fadl v. Cent.
Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912
F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. See Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392,398-99 (4th Cir. 2004).
94. Id; Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 15.
95. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882.
96. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101. The D.C. Circuit followed the Ninth's lead in 1996
and the Sixth did in 2002. Keller, 277 F.3d at 815; El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671.
97. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1097-98. Vincente B. Chuidian, a citizen of the Philippines
and owner of businesses in California, brought suit against Raul Daza, an official of the
Philippine government and member of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), when Daza forbade the Philippine National Bank from honoring a
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inquiry with an analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)." The court observed that
"[w]hile section 1603(b) may not explicitly include individuals within its
definition of foreign instrumentalities, neither does it expressly exclude
them."' 9 Further, the court noted that the legislative history of the FSIA
did not indicate a desire for the immunity of individual foreign officials
letter of credit Chuidian received from the Republic of the Philippines. Id. at 1097.
Chuidian also sued the Philippine National Bank and several other officials. Id. Daza
argued that the case should be dismissed because he was immune from suit. Id. at 1098.
The district court granted Daza's motion, holding that as a member of the PCGG acting in
an official capacity, he enjoyed sovereign immunity. Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in the case of Keller v. Central Bank of
Nigeria. 277 F.3d at 815 (emphasizing that "[i]ndividuals who act outside the scope of
their authority are not entitled to immunity"). The case involved claims of breach of
contract, misrepresentation, and fraud brought by a United States citizen against several
parties, including the Central Bank of Nigeria and individual bank officials. Id. at 814.
The district court in Keller held that the FSIA did not immunize the individual bank
officials because they were participants in a commercial activity. Id. at 815. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit first considered the individual foreign officials' immunity under the FSIA
commercial activity exception. Id. at 815-18. The court observed that "normally foreign
sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting in their official capacities as officers of
corporations considered foreign sovereigns." Id. at 815 (citing El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671).
The court held that the commercial activity exception applied in this case. Id. at 818.
In El-Fadl, Hassan E1-Fadl brought a wrongful termination suit against the Petra
International Banking Corporation as well as tort claims against the Central Bank of
Jordan, the bank's governor and deputy governor, and Petra. El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 669-70.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Central Bank,
governor, and deputy governor were immune from suit under the FSIA. Id. The district
court held that the governor and deputy governor had acted in their official capacity on
behalf of the Central Bank and therefore qualified for immunity. Id. at 671. El-Fadl
appealed the district court's immunity determination as to the deputy governor, arguing
that he had not acted in his official capacity, but in his individual capacity. Id. The
District of Columbia Circuit concurred with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Chuidian that
an individual foreign official can qualify as an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA.
Id. (citing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-03). Ultimately, the circuit court affirmed the
district court's determination that the deputy governor was immune because El-Fadl failed
to carry his evidentiary burden on the issue. Id.
98. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100-01. Three different arguments were made by the
various parties that had an interest in Chuidian. Id. at 1099. Defendant Daza argued that
as a member of a Philippine executive branch committee he was a foreign official, and
thereby entitled to immunity as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state under the
FSIA. Id. at 1099. The plaintiff alternatively contended that the FSIA did not apply to
Daza or that one of the Act's exceptions applied. Id. The United States filed a Statement
of Interest in which it argued that the FSIA did not immunize Daza because of his status
as an individual, but that Daza was qualified for the immunity set out in the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law. Id. at 1099; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(b),(f) (1965) (providing immunity to "[a foreign state's]
head of state and any person designated by him as a member of his official party... [and]
any other public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in
his official capacity").
99. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
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to be considered separately from that of foreign states.'° The Ninth
Circuit noted that to exclude individual foreign official immunity from
the FSIA would contradict the purpose of the Act. 1 Because the statute
was meant to codify the existing common law and remove immunity
decisions from the discretion of the Department of State, exclusion of
individual foreign officials from the statute would create a "blanket
abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity by allowing litigants to
accomplish indirectly what the Act barred them from doing directly."'1O2
If individual foreign officials were not permitted to claim immunity
under the statute, and the statute was the sole source of foreign sovereign
immunity, plaintiffs would be encouraged to sue the individual foreign
official instead of the foreign state, which would be immune from suit
under the FSIA. °3 The court ultimately concluded that § 1603(b) should
be read to include individual foreign officials in the definition of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, and the defendant's claim of
sovereign immunity therefore should be analyzed under the FSIA.'4
100. Id.
101. Id. ("Such an omission is particularly significant in light of numerous statements
that Congress intended the Act to codify the existing common law principles of sovereign
immunity .... If in fact the Act does not include such officials, the Act contains a
substantial unannounced departure from prior common law. The most that can be
concluded from the preceding discussion is that the Act is ambiguous as to its extension to
individual foreign officials.").
102. Id. at 1102.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1103. After holding that the FSIA should be read to grant immunity to
individual foreign officials who qualify under the statute, the court considered whether
Daza's conduct fell into one of the FSIA's statutory exceptions. Id. at 1103-06. The court
ultimately held that none of the exceptions applied to Chuidian's case. Id. at 1106; see also
Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
FSIA is silent as to individual foreign officials). In the Fourth Circuit case of Velasco v.
Government of Indonesia, the plaintiff brought suit against former staff members of the
National Defense Security Council of the Republic of Indonesia (NDSC) claiming he was
owed a payment of $2.8 million on a promissory note the NDSC issued. 370 F.3d at 395.
The district court held that the FSIA granted sovereign immunity to the former staff
members as they were individual foreign officials and that the circumstances of the dispute
did not implicate the commercial activities exception to the FSIA. Id. at 397. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed and noted the Chuidian holding. Id. at 398; Herbage v. Meese,
747 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Nowhere does the FSIA discuss the liability or role of
natural persons, whether governmental officials or private citizens. Nonetheless, decisions
in other federal courts, as well as reason, indicate-even if only indirectly-that the sovereign
immunity granted in the FSIA does extend to natural persons acting as agents of the
sovereign."); see also First Am. Corp. v. AI-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1120 (D.D.C. 1996)
(citing Herbage, 747 F. Supp. at 66) (noting that the FSIA is silent as to individual
immunity, but that policy considerations dictate that individuals acting in their official
rather than individual capacity should be granted immunity).
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3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Does Not Provide for the
Immunity of Individuals Acting in Their Official Capacity
In contrast to the interpretation of the FSIA illustrated by the Ninth
Circuit, which held that individual foreign officials could claim immunity
from suit under the FSIA, is the approach of the Seventh Circuit,
rejecting an interpretation of the FSIA that would extend immunity to
individual foreign officials.' 5 Enahoro v. Abubakar involved several
Nigerian citizens who brought suit against Nigerian General Abubakar
under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging torture and other causes of
action. O Abubakar claimed immunity as a Nigerian public official under
the FSIA.' °7 The Seventh Circuit held that Abubakar, as an individual
foreign official of the state, was not immune from suit.'O' The Seventh
Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's immunity analysis. The court
rejected the argument that Congress's failure to explicitly exclude
individual foreign officials from the statute implied that individuals
should be included.'9 The court disputed the Ninth Circuit's assertion
that the requirement that an agency or instrumentality be a separate
legal person did not necessarily exclude individuals."0  The court
reasoned that the placement of the phrase "corporate or otherwise"
directly after "separate legal person" in § 1603(b)(1) was done
purposefully, with the intention that the phrase "corporate or otherwise"
would modify "separate legal person." The entire clause therefore would
"refer[] to a legal fiction-a business entity which is a legal person.' In
the court's view, it followed that "[i]f Congress meant to include
individuals acting in the [sic] official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it
would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.""2  The court
further warned that concluding that Congress had impliedly included
individual foreign official immunity in the FSIA would interfere with the
placement of the burden of proof."3 Under the FSIA, the individual
105. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005).
106. Id. at 878-79.
107. Id. at 880.
108. Id. at 882.
109. Id. (citing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101) ("We are troubled by this approach-that
is, by saying Congress did not exclude individuals; therefore they are included.").
110. Id. at 881; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §
1603(b)(1) (2000).
111. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881.
112. Id. at 881-82. The Seventh Circuit had recently decided that immunity for heads
of state was not governed by the FSIA, and the court used its analysis in Ye v. Zemin, 383
F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) as a point of comparison. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881.
113. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882 ("Not only does [this approach] seem upside down as a
matter of logic, but it ignores the traditional burden of proof on immunity issues under the
FSIA.").
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claiming immunity must establish that he meets the requirements set out
in the FSIA to qualify as foreign state and that he is eligible for
immunity.
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II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT DOES NOT GOVERN
THE IMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN OFFICIALS
The text and legislative history of the statute, statements made by the
Department of State, as well as customary international law, all support
the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals when it
denied that individual foreign official immunity was governed by the
FSIA. These sources each indicate that the common law of immunity
developed prior to the enactment of the FSIA should govern individual
foreign official immunity.
A. The Text and Legislative History Indicate that the FSIA Does Not
Apply to Individual Foreign Officials
Both the text and legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act illustrate that the Act was not intended to govern the
immunity of individual foreign officials. Instead, these sources indicate
that individual foreign immunity should be governed by the pre-existing
common law.
1. The Statutory Language "Agency or Instrumentality of a State" Does
Not Apply to Individuals
The legislative history of the FSIA demonstrates that the primary
concern that made the FSIA "urgently needed legislation" was the
recognition that "[i]n a modern world where foreign state enterprises are
every day participants in commercial activities,' ' judicially created
standards were needed to assure those dealing with foreign government
market participants that any disputes between the parties would be fairly
resolved. " ' The language of the statute mirrors the legislature's primary
114. Id.; see also supra note 88 (discussing the shifting burden of proof).
115. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605;
see also Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (asserting that the
FSIA "was crafted primarily to allow state-owned companies, which had proliferated in
the communist world and in the developing countries, to be sued in United States courts in
connection with their commercial activities"); Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26,
at 11.
116. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605. The
legislative history of the statute provides examples of situations to which Congress
envisioned the FSIA would apply, such as where a foreign state trading company enters
into a business agreement with an American citizen, or where a foreign government entity
invests in real estate sold by an American citizen, and disputes arise as to the contracts
between the parties. Id. Note that both of these examples involve situations where an
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concern for commercial enterprises of a foreign state. The FSIA codifies
immunity for a foreign state and § 1603(a) further defines a foreign state
to include a "political subdivision" or an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in [§ 1603(b)]."" 7 To qualify as an agency or an
instrumentality within the FSIA, the entity must meet three conjunctive
requirements. First, an agency or instrumentality must be a "separate
legal person, corporate or otherwise."" 8 Second, the entity must be an
"organ" of the foreign state itself or a political subdivision of the foreign
state." 9 Third, the agency or instrumentality cannot qualify as a citizen of
the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) or (e) 2° and cannot be
"created under the laws of any third country.''
Noticeably missing from the definition of an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state in the FSIA is mention of an individual foreign official
or a head of state.'22 The definition does not include an "individual" or
refer to a "natural person."' 23 These definitions establish the contrary by
defining a foreign state narrowly to include only foreign states
themselves, "political subdivisions of foreign states," or the "agenc[ies]
or instrumentalit[ies] of a foreign state.' 2 4 While the statute uses the
phrase "separate legal person," it is immediately qualified by the phrase
"corporate or otherwise," indicating a desire to limit the definition to
incorporated and unincorporated business entities.
The House of Representatives Report on the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act provided several examples of what would be considered
agency- or government-owned corporation is involved, as opposed to an individual foreign
official. See id.
117. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2000); Matar
Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 10-11.
118. Id. § 1603(b)(1).
119. Id. § 1603(b)(2). In the event that an entity does not meet the organ requirement,
the separate legal person may qualify if a majority of its shares are held by a foreign state
or its political subdivision. Id.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2000)
(governing the citizenship of corporations and the legal representatives of estates, infants,
and incompetents); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining the term
"'states').
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3).
122. See id. § 1603; see also Michael A. Tunks, Note, Diplomats or Defendants?
Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 666 (2002).
123. See § 1603; see also Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The
definition does not explicitly include individuals who either head the government or
participate in it at some high level.").
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2000). But see Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The terms 'agency,' 'instrumentality,' 'organ,' 'entity,' and
'legal person,' while perhaps more readily connoting an organization or collective, do not
in their typical legal usage necessarily exclude individuals.").
125. See § 1603(b)(1); see also Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881-82.
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a separate legal person." The Report explained that a separate legal
person was "intended to include a corporation, association, foundation,
or any other entity which, under the law of the foreign state where it was
created, can sue or be sued in its own name, contract in its own name or
hold property in its own name.', 7 These illustrations support the
proposition that generally, the law does not speak of natural persons as
being created by law.'2 The Report also provided some examples of
entities that would meet the three requirements necessary to satisfy the
statutory definition of an agency or instrumentality. 129 These entities
included "a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport
organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central
bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency or a
department or ministry which acts and is suable in its own name."'"3
Again, the examples provided by the House of Representatives Report
illustrate the legislature's exclusive concern with immunity
determinations of commercial enterprises of a foreign state.13'
Prior to providing examples of entities that would qualify as agents or
instrumentalities of a foreign state, the Report explicitly affirms that
"[a]n entity which does not fall within the definitions of sections 1603 (a)
or (b) would not be entitled to sovereign immunity in any case before a
Federal or State court.' ' 32  Thus, the legislative history of the FSIA
confirms that Congress intended for the statute to be the source of
immunity determinations in only specifically delineated circumstances.
3
During the congressional hearings that occurred prior to the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Bruno Ristau, an
126. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6614; see also § 1603(b)(1).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614; see
also 13A FED. PROC. L. ED. Foreign Relations § 36:398 (2006) (listing entities that have
qualified as a foreign state under the FSIA as including "[a] corporation wholly owned by
a foreign government[;] [a] nationalized bank; [c]entral banks[;] [a] permanent mission to
the United Nations; [b]ranches of the armed forces of a foreign country[;] [a] national
railroad or national airline[;] [a] petroleum company owned and controlled by the foreign
state[;] [a] foreign state's central bank, or a liquidator appointed by the foreign state's
central bank[;] [a] national university; and [a] wholly owned foreign trading company
organized under the laws of a foreign state" (footnotes omitted)).
128. See 13A FED. PROC. § 36:398 ("The term [foreign state] does not include natural
persons, such as a minister in the government of a foreign state sued in his individual
capacity." (footnotes omitted)).
129. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15-16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6613-14.
130. Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614.
131. See id. at 15-16, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6613-14.
132. Id. at 15, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614.
133. See id. at 7, 14, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613.
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official with the Department of Justice, commented on the scope of the
FSIA.'m He mentioned that while Lufthansa, a German airline, may be
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the statute,
American courts would never have jurisdiction over the German
chancellor under the FSIA.'35 Akin to this statement is the explicit
acknowledgement in the House Report that "the bill deals only with the
immunity of foreign states and not its diplomatic or consular
representatives."'16 While an individual foreign official is distinct from a
head of state or diplomatic official, individual foreign officials more
closely resemble these other officials than foreign state market
participants whose immunity the FSIA was intended to codify."' Thus,
the legislative history of the FSIA indicates that Congress intended to
separate a class of natural persons from the class of foreign states and
agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states whose immunity the statute
was intended to address.'
38
2. The Department of State Maintains that Individual Foreign Official
Immunity Should be Governed by the Pre-Existing Common Law
Both the Department of State and the Department of Justice
recommended the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.3 9
Yet the Department of State has maintained that individual foreign
official immunity is governed by the body of common law that existed
prior to the enactment of the FSIA.'4 The Department continued to
issue Statements of Interest when suits were brought against individual
foreign officials in federal district court.14' The executive branch
134. Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on
Claims and Government Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 16 (1976)
(statement of Bruno Risteau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Unit, Dep't of Justice), quoted in
Tunks, supra note 121, at 667.
135. Id.
136. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 21, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6620.
Neither the doctrine of sovereign immunity nor the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
applied to the immunity of foreign diplomatic individuals in the United States. Id. at 8, as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (distinguishing diplomatic immunity).
Diplomatic immunity is governed by a separate statute and Congress did not intend to
change this immunity with the enactment of the FSIA. Id. at 12, as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610.
137. See id. at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
138. See Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 6-7.
139. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
140. See Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 2 ("[F]oreign officials such as
Dichter do enjoy immunity from suit for their official acts. This immunity is not codified
in the FSIA but instead is rooted in longstanding common law that the FSIA did not
displace.").
141. E.g., Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27; Matar Statement of
Interest, supra note 26.
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explicitly stated that immunity determinations of individual foreign
officials should not be made under the FSIA in a Statement of Interest
issued to the court in the 2007 case of Kensington International Ltd. v.
Itoua.142 The executive branch has vigorously maintained this position in
response to the conflicting interpretations of the FSIA by the Fourth,
Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits. 14
3
B. Concluding that Immunity of Individual Foreign Officials is Within the
Scope of the FSIA is at Odds with Customary International Law
As the application of foreign sovereign immunity has repercussions for
international law and policy,"' a primary motivation behind the
enactment of the FSIA was to bring United States sovereign immunity
doctrine into conformity with the doctrines of other countries. As
stated in the House of Representatives Report, the enactment of the
FSIA would ensure that "U.S. immunity practice would conform to the
practice in virtually every other country.' ' 46 Upon signing the FSIA into
law on October 22, 1976, President Ford stated, "'the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act carries forward a modern and enlightened trend in
international law. And it makes this development in the law available to
all American citizens.' ' 147 The desire to harmonize American policy with
that of the international community is a recurring theme in the area of
foreign sovereign immunity. The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity was adopted in the Tate Letter in part because of the policy
developments in foreign states who themselves distinguished between
the public and commercial acts of foreign states when deciding whether a
state should be immune from suit. Restrictive immunity was
142. Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 3 (citing Matar Statement
of Interest, supra note 26, at 2).
143. Id. ("While a number of courts, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chuidian
v. Philippine National Bank, have construed the FSIA to extend to individuals, this
construction is unsound and yields problematic results." (citation omitted)); see Velasco v.
Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig.,
277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990).
144. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 2.
145. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
146. Id.
147. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1554
(Oct. 22, 1976), quoted in von Mehren, supra note 60, at 33.
148. See Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank Wooldridge, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 199, 204 (1972) ("The Tate Letter was the culmination of a policy which
had been pursued by the State Department for many years. In this statement a survey of
the practice regarding immunity in various countries was made, and it concluded that only
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recognized in "all of the important trading and industrial countries of the
Western world, with the sole exception of the United Kingdom, 149 prior
to its adoption in the United States. It gained further recognition in
international law when it was integrated into international agreements
such as "the European Convention on State Immunity, the Brussels
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity
of State-Owned Vessels, and the Treaty of Peace with Germany.""o
One foreign state that has enacted a sovereign immunity statute and
yet has continued to assess immunity as to individual foreign officials
according to common law is Canada."' The Canadian court system has
declined to read immunity for individual foreign officials into the statute
that provides immunity to foreign states. 52 While Canada has recognized
that individual foreign officials should be granted immunity, Canadian
courts have held that common law principles should govern foreign
sovereign immunity when applied to individuals."3 In Jaffe v. Miller, the
leading case, the Ontario Court of Appeals asserted that although
Canada's foreign sovereign immunity statute "is silent on its application
to employees of the foreign state [it] can only mean that Parliament is
content to have the determination of which employees are entitled to
immunity determined at common law. 1 14 Canada's method of determin-
ing individual foreign official immunity is very similar to the approach
urged by the United States executive branch through the Department of
State."5
III. COMMON LAW IMMUNITY SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO INDIVIDUAL
FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNTIL THE FSIA IS AMENDED BY CONGRESS
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as currently enacted, does not
provide immunity to individual foreign officials.' The statute governs
English and Soviet law recognized the doctrine of absolute immunity." (footnote
omitted)); see also Tate Letter, supra note 63, at 985.
149. von Mehren, supra note 60, at 38.
150. Id. (footnotes omitted). The relevant provision of the Treaty of Peace with
Germany provided that "[i]f the German Government engages in international trade, it
shall not in respect thereof have or be deemed to have any rights, privileges or immunities
of sovereignty."' Id. at 39 n.25 (quoting 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 43, 170 (C.I. Bevans ed.,
U.S. Department of State 1969)).
151. Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] 103 D.L.R. 315, 328 (Ont. Ct. App. Can.); see also Matar
Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 20-21.
152. Jaffe, 103 D.L.R. at 328.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 19-23.
156. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005).
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immunity as to foreign states and agencies or instrumentalities or organs
of foreign states, but excludes individual foreign officials. 157  A close
examination of the text of the FSIA,158 its legislative history,"9 and certain
principles of international law' 60 supports this interpretation. Although
Congress enacted the FSIA with the intent that it would clarify existing
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, the law has not produced such a
result, at least with regard to individual foreign officials.16' As the
situation presents itself in 2008, individual foreign officials may be
subject to an immunity determination under the FSIA depending upon
the location of federal court in which the plaintiff files suit. 62
A. Individual Foreign Officials Must Be Entitled to Sovereign Immunity
to Prevent Litigants from Circumventing Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Despite doctrinal confusion, individual foreign official immunity is a
vital part of the broader concept of foreign sovereign immunity. If a
court fails to recognize that an individual foreign official qualifies for
immunity from suit when performing official duties on behalf of his
country, plaintiffs could frustrate the purposes behind the enactment of
the FSIA. 163  A plaintiff could sue the individual foreign official
responsible for a foreign state entity, as opposed to the entity itself, and
thereby frustrate the legislative policy goal of granting immunity to
qualified foreign state actors.'6" As the executive branch cautioned,
157. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West
2006 & Supp. 2007); Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882.
158. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603-04; Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095,
1102 (9th Cir. 1990).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6604-06.
160. Id.; Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22-23.
161. Working Group of the American Bar Association, supra note 24, at 531-32
(summarizing the interpretations of the FSIA term "foreign state" and recommending that
the FSIA be amended to include immunity for individual foreign officials acting in their
official capacities, but not foreign heads of state).
162. See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882; Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392,
398-99 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir.
2002); EI-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990).
163. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 4.
164. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102. It could be argued that the United States has
permitted plaintiffs to circumvent sovereign immunity by authorizing them to bring suit
against individual United States officials in certain circumstances, and thus it is acceptable
to permit the circumvention of foreign sovereign immunity. Most notably, the Supreme
Court has permitted suit to be brought against state officials in two contexts: (1) when a
plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated the Constitution or a "federal statute or
regulation that is the supreme law of the land," or (2) when a plaintiff brings a suit against
a state official under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 17A CHARLES ALAN
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"unless sovereign immunity extends to individual foreign officials,
litigants could easily circumvent the immunity provided to foreign states
by the FSIA."' This unwelcome result was acknowledged by the Ninth
Circuit in Chuidian.1'6 In an effort to prevent this possibility, the Ninth
Circuit held that individual foreign official immunity should be governed
by the FSIA. Thus, a plaintiff with a claim against a foreign state could
not simply name a foreign official as a defendant, in an effort to bring
about a more successful outcome. 16' The Ninth Circuit's holding
temporarily resolved the controversy over the immunity of individual
foreign officials and the FSIA. However, in 2005, the Seventh Circuit
decision in Enahoro rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit, forcing the
immunity of individual foreign officials into dispute and creating a circuit
split that has encouraged forum shopping1 6
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4232 (3d ed. 2007) (describing
the Young doctrine); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The Court
does not authorize the plaintiff to make an end run around the sovereign immunity of the
United States by suing the state official because the right of the sovereign to immunity has
been stripped from the situation. However, both of these situations strengthen, rather
than undermine, the argument that plaintiffs should be prohibited from making an end run
around foreign sovereign immunity by suing an individual foreign official.
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that where "[t]he act to be enforced is
alleged to be unconstitutional ...the use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of
... the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity." 209 U.S. at 159-60. The state
actor essentially loses her affiliation with the sovereign when she enforces an act that
violates the supreme law of the land. Id. at 159-60 (stating that the state official would be
"stripped of his official or representative character and ... subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct," and that "[tihe State has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States").
The FTCA, enacted in 1946, was "designed primarily to remove the sovereign
immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to
render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like
circumstances." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962). The rationale for the
enactment of the FTCA illustrates that neither the legislature nor the courts authorized an
end run around the sovereign immunity of the United States. The statute was meant to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the state as well as the individual official for tort
claims brought against the government as a result of an individual official's negligence. 14
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3658 (3d ed.
1998). The FTCA does not authorize the plaintiff to evade the sovereign immunity of the
United States by bringing suit against an individual official, but it abrogates the sovereign
immunity of the state and individual official under circumstances deemed appropriate by
Congress. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (West 2006 &
Supp. 2007).
165. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 14.
166. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102.
167. Id.
168. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005).
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B. To Allow Litigants to Circumvent Foreign Sovereign Immunity Would
Risk Violating Principles of International Comity
As a result of the conflicting legal interpretations, a plaintiff may be
able to successfully bring a suit, depending on the jurisdiction, against an
individual foreign official and circumvent the sovereignty of a foreignS• 169
state. The circuit split encourages a plaintiff to choose a forum whose
laws would be most receptive to a particular legal position.170 Allowing
plaintiffs to exploit the ambiguity in the FSIA is particularly dangerous
because of the potential foreign policy ramifications and the risk of
violating principles of international comity. "1 International comity has
been defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws. 17  The House of Representatives Report on the FSIA clearly
stated that a major impetus behind the law was to bring American
foreign sovereign immunity policies in line with "virtually every other
country." '173 While in other areas of the law a court may be reluctant to
look to international norms, foreign sovereign immunity is an area of the
law where international norms are a necessary factor.1 4 The Department
of State has articulated a need to comply with these standards in the
name of reciprocity.7 The Department of State warned against the
dangers of refusing to recognize immunity as to individual foreign
officials, stating that "[g]iven the global leadership responsibilities of the
United States, its officials are at special risk of being made the targets of
politically driven lawsuits abroad." '76  These international policy
169. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 14; cf. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v.
Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 160 (2d Cir. 2007).
170. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102; see also 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1276
(2007) (defining forum shopping as "bring[ing] an action in a particular district because
the court of appeals in the circuit encompassing that district has decided a question of law
involved in the suit that has not been decided in the transferee district, and such forum-
shopping may be considered a factor in favor of the transfer," unless that is the district in
which the plaintiff resides).
171. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22.
172. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
173. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
174. See id. at 7, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06; see also Matar
Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22.
175. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22.
176. Id.; see also BANKAS, supra note 32, at 35 ("The trends which are already clear in
the study of public international law with respect to the concept of sovereign immunity
logically are not mere birth pangs of a new legal order. These trends in the real sense are
the harbinger of fundamental problems which will arise one after another in search for a
legal solution that perhaps will command the opinio juris the world over. It is submitted
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considerations dictate that inaction by Congress or the Supreme Court in
this area of the law is not acceptable."'
C. Congress Should Amend the FSIA to Clarify the Procedure for
Granting Immunity to Individual Foreign Officials
The most efficient way to resolve the circuit split is to amend the FSIA
to explicitly provide for individual foreign official immunity. A Working
Group of the American Bar Association (ABA) issued a report in 2002
addressing the "difficulties courts and parties are encountering [with the
FSIA] and propos[ing] relevant amendments to improve the overall
operation of the Act." 178 The Report recommended that the FSIA be
amended to explicitly state that individual foreign officials acting in their
official capacities are entitled to immunity, similar to a foreign state
under the statute. '79 The ABA Report recognized that as the statute
exists currently, the text of the FSIA is silent as to whether individual
foreign officials should be included in the statute's immunity
determination, '80 and that if the statute were to be amended to include
individual foreign officials, other provisions of the statute would need to
be modified accordingly. 8 For example, regarding service of process,
the statute would have to be amended to recognize "treaty obligations
conferring certain jurisdictional immunities on diplomatic and consular
officials" and other special circumstances that may arise in the course of
service of process on individual foreign officials.'2 Thus, the courts
would be ill-advised to apply the FSIA to individual foreign officials
without such an amendment to the statute.'83
However, until the FSIA is amended or the Supreme Court clarifies
the issue, courts should look to the pre-existing common law when
that any piecemeal attempt ... to resolve the problem of state immunities and commercial
activities on the international plane ... will consume so much time and resources that little
will be left for other ... equally pressing legitimate problems of concern in international
law.").
177. Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22.
178. Working Group of the American Bar Association, supra note 24, at 489-90.
179. Id. at 538.
180. Id. at 531.
181. Id. at 536-37.
182. Id. ("Service of process and a consequent claim of personal jurisdiction on a ...
government official on official business may cause personal affront and can be a violation
of diplomatic immunity.").
183. See id. The Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits granted
individual foreign officials immunity under the FSIA but did not address service of process
under the FSIA. See Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir.
2004); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002); EI-Fadl v.
Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l
Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990).
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making individual foreign official immunity determinations.184  The
Supreme Court reaffirmed its general reluctance to recognize a body of
federal common law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.'8 The Court in Sosa
did, however, recognize that disputes of international law have serious
implications for United States foreign policy.186 Although the application
of federal common law is not favored, the Supreme Court has at least
recognized that countervailing considerations of foreign policy may
mitigate an absolute prohibition on the use of federal common law. 187 A
primary concern relating to the use of federal common law is that the
Constitution does not explicitly authorize the federal courts to do so.'8 It
is feared that the federal common law is "'little less than what the judge
advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a
particular subject.' '1 89 But in the area of foreign sovereign immunity, this
concern is unfounded. The common law on individual foreign official
immunity determinations (at least until the split of authority is resolved)
is not susceptible to a variety of judicial interpretations., 9° The common
law establishes that "American jurisprudence has long recognized
individual officials of foreign sovereigns to be immune from civil suit
with respect to their official acts."' 9' Thus, the reliance of federal courts
on the pre-FSIA common law, until a more satisfactory resolution of the
issue can be reached, is an acceptable solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
United States foreign policy requires the resolution of the split of
authority on the issue of foreign sovereign immunity as applied to
individual foreign officials. Congress did not intend to supersede the
pre-existing common law as it applied to individual foreign officials with
the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as evidenced by
184. See Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 3.
185. 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004). Sosa addresses federal common law in the context of
the Federal Tort Claims Act not the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, however, the
Supreme Court's discussion of federal common law in the realm of international law is
nonetheless significant.
186. See id. at 730 (noting that " 'international disputes implicating ... our relations
with foreign nations' are one of the 'narrow areas' in which 'federal common law'
continues to exist") (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
641 (1981)).
187. Id. ("It would take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert
their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect individuals.").
188. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
189. Id. (quoting Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
190. See Kensington Int'l Statement of Interest, supra note 27, at 3.
191. Id.
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the text of the statute,' 92 its legislative history, and international
trends.1'9 As rapid globalization and the growing interdependence of
foreign states continues to increase international litigation, the FSIA will
become more important for adjudicating the rights of both litigants and
targeted foreign officials. An inefficient and confusing application of the
FSIA to individual foreign officials will not only detract from efficient
judicial administration, but may also have serious repercussions for
United States foreign policy.
192. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-04 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6604-06.
194. Id.; Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 26, at 22-23.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 57:853
